Does Contract Law Need Morality?

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the market-place as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the mar-ket theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and the-ory should account for values other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate. Whatever the merits of that debate, we conclude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of markets

Does Contract Law Need Morality?

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the market-place as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the mar-ket theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and the-ory should account for values other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate. Whatever the merits of that debate, we conclude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of markets

Molecular Dynamics Simulation Study Of Water-Soluble Cryptophane Binding A Variety Guest Objects

Given their signicance to chemical sensing and molecular recognition, host-guest interactions are of broad interest in molecular science. Cryptophanes, which are a kind of spherical cage molecules, are one of the most applicable host molecules. Herein computer simulation is used to address the binding of cryptophanes to monatomic guest species in aqueous environments. Water soluble cryptophanes have high binding anity to Xe-129, which is a powerful contrast agent for magnetic resonance imaging and can be used as an NMR-based biosensor. Molecular details of Xe-cryptophane binding are hard to obtain from experiment, however. Extensive molecular dynamics simulation are carried out to understand the underlying molecular features of the Xe-cryptophane system. Free energy perturbation and adaptive biasing force methods are used to obtain the energetic aspects of cryptophane-Xe interactions: binding anities of individual cryptophanes to Xe and potentials of mean force for Xe to entry the cavity. Additionally, the structure adjustments cryptophane undergoes as it accommodates Xe are investigated in depth. From the simulations, the hydrophobicity of cryptophane interior and the kinetics of water enter the cavity are found to be correlated with the Xe binding anity. These ndings shed light on the design of Xe-binding cryptophanes. A related cryptophane is considered for the selective binding of alkali metal ions. The cryptophane has particularly high binding anities with the large cesium cation. The Cs-137 isotope is a common, problematic radioactive nuclear ssion byproduct. The simulations provide insight on the relative anities of alkali cations and the roles of water molecules that enter the cavity along with ions. The simulations reveal that the high bind- ing anity of cryptophane to Cs+ may result from the comparatively low solvation energy of Cs+ and its geometric t to the cryptophane cavity

Contract Development In A Matching Market: The Case of Kidney Exchange

We analyze a new transplant innovation — Advanced Donation, referred to by some as a kidney “gift certificate,” “layaway plan,” or “voucher — as a case study offering insights on both market and contract development. Advanced Donation provides an unusual window into the evolution of the exchange of a single good — a kidney for transplantation — from gift, to simple barter, to exchange with a temporal separation of obligations that relies solely on trust and reputational constraints for enforcement, to a complex matching market in which the parties rely, at least in part, on formal contract to define and clarify their obligations to each other. The transplant community, however, has historically viewed formal contracts in the transplant setting with discomfort, and that traditional discomfort remains evident in current Advanced Donation practice. We conclude that the use of formal contracts in Advanced Donation is likely inadvertent, and the contracts, in a number of ways, are inadequate to tackle the complex, nonsimultaneous exchange of kidneys in which patients donate a kidney before their intended recipients have been matched with a potential donor